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NOTE 
THROW A DOG A SUSPECT: 
WHEN USING POLICE DOGS 
BECOMES AN UNREASONABLE 
USE OF FORCE UNDER THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
A felony suspect, hiding in the woods outside his parents' 
rural home in Washington State suddenly finds himself in the 
clutches of a police dog with a biting force of 800 to 1200 
pounds per square inch, comparable to a car running over a 
body part.l As the suspect screams in agony, police anxiously 
make their way through the dark, unfamiliar woods to find 
him.2 Although this police dog ordinarily bites a suspect for no 
more than four seconds, in this instance, the dog continued to 
bite for forty-five to sixty seconds, until police finally located 
the suspect.3 Because of this attack, the suspect suffered ex-
tensive and permanent injuries to his upper arm.4 
While the Ninth Circuit has generally held that using 
properly trained police dogs does not constitute deadly or ex-
cessive force, the court reexamined the issues in Miller v. Clark 
County.5 Specifically, the court addressed whether a dog bite 
1 Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 960-962 (9th Cir. 2003). 
21d. at 961. 
31d. 
41d. 
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continuing for close to a minute was excessive or deadly force.6 
The court held that despite the extremely long duration of the 
dog bite and the extensive injuries Miller suffered as a result, 
the bite was neither deadly nor excessive force. 7 
This Note contends that a dog bite lasting up to a minute 
is excessive force under these circumstances and violated 
Miller's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable sei-
zures. Part I of this Note provides a general synthesis of cur-
rent Fourth Amendment seizure law as it applies to using po-
lice dogs.s Part II discusses the facts of Miller and the court's 
application of current case law to those facts. 9 Finally, Part III 
argues that the court failed to properly apply existing Fourth 
Amendment seizure law to the facts in Miller, and therefore, 
the force used was unreasonable.10 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."ll A person is "seized" for Fourth 
Amendment purposes when arrested by a police officerP Thus, 
when a police officer arrests a suspect, the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits using unreasonable force to make the arrest. IS This, 
however, does not mean the officer can use no force, but rather 
the force used must be reasonable under the circumstances.14 
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has developed a 
reasonableness standard for deadly force, and another less rig-
orous reasonableness standard for all other force used by police 
officers.15 Therefore, in the police dog context, courts must first 
assess whether using a dog is deadly force and if not deadly, 
6 [d. 
7 [d. at 963. 
8 See infra notes 11 to 132 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 133 to 184 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 185 to 228 and accompanying text. 
11 U.S. Canst. amend. IV. 
12 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). 
13 [d. 
14 [d. at 396. 
15 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962 n.3. 
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courts next examine whether the force was excessive under the 
less rigorous standard. I6 
A TENNESSEE V. GARNER: WHEN USING DEADLY FORCE Is 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE 
In Tennessee v. Garner, the United States Supreme Court 
held that it is unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional under 
the Fourth Amendment, for an officer to use deadly force to 
stop a fleeing suspect unless the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the suspect poses a "significant threat of death or 
serious physical injury to the officers or others."17 In Garner, a 
Memphis police officer shot a felony suspect in the back of the 
head as he fled from the scene of a burglary. 18 At the time of 
the shooting, the officer stated that he was "reasonably sure" 
that Gamer did not have a weapon. I9 
Gamer's father sought damages against the officer under 
42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming the shooting violated his son's 
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.2o The 
officer, in tum, relied on a Tennessee statute that provided, "If, 
after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either 
flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary 
means to affect [sic] the arrest. "21 After the initial trial and 
appeal, the Federal District Court for the Western District of 
Tennessee found in favor of the officer.22 On subsequent ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and 
remanded, holding the statute unconstitutional,23 The State of 
Tennessee appealed the decision.24 
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, holding 
the Tennessee statute unconstitutional because it authorized 
16Id. 
17 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,3 (1985) (internal quotes omitted). 
IBId. at 4. 
19 Id. at 3 (internal quotes omitted). 
20 Id. at 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "every person who under color of any 
statute, ordinance, regulation ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Thus, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 allows an individual to recover damages for injuries allegedly caused by 
a police officer. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388. 
21 Garner, 471 U.S. at 4. 
22Id. at 6. 
23Id. 
24 Id. at 7. 
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the unreasonable use of force against a suspect who posed "no 
immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others.''25 To 
determine the reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court held it is necessary to "balance the na-
ture and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the importance of the govern-
mental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. "26 In applying 
this balancing test to the force used against Garner, the Court 
concluded that using deadly force to prevent his escape was 
unreasonable.27 The Tennessee statute was thus unconstitu-
tional because it permitted using deadly force against all flee-
ing suspects, without regard to whether the force was reason-
able under the circumstances.28 Therefore, because Garner 
presented no immediate threat to the officers, using deadly 
force to prevent his escape was unreasonable, and thus uncon-
stitutionaU9 However, the Court went on to hold that, "Where 
an officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to oth-
ers, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by 
using deadly force."30 
B. GRAHAM V. CONNOR: AsSESSING THE REASONABLENESS OF 
NON-DEADLY FORCE 
Subsequently, in Graham v. Connor, the United States 
Supreme Court developed a standard to evaluate when force 
used by police, while not deadly, was nevertheless excessive 
given the circumstances surrounding a suspect's arrest.31 In 
Graham, police detained a diabetic whose suspicious behavior 
was the result of an insulin reaction.32 A police officer noticed 
Graham and his companion quickly leave a convenience store 
and then drive away.33 The officer followed by car, and decided 
ted). 
25 [d. at 11, 22. 
26 [d. at 8 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703) (internal quotes omit-
27 [d. at 1I. 
28 [d. 
29 [d. at 3. 
30 [d. at 11. 
31 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
32 [d. at 388-389. 
33 [d. at 389. 
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to make an investigatory stop.34 In the midst of his insulin re-
action, Graham exited the car, ran around it twice, sat down on 
the curb, and briefly passed out.35 A number of officers arrived, 
handcuffed Graham, and among other things, shoved his face 
into the hood of the car.36 Graham suffered serious injuries re-
sulting from the arrest, including a broken foot, cuts and 
bruises, and a shoulder injury.37 Graham later filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of North 
Carolina, alleging the officers used excessive force during his 
arrest.3S The district court granted the defendants' motion for a 
directed verdict.39 A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed.40 
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 
concluding the district court erred in failing to analyze the ex-
cessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness standard.41 The Court once again applied the balancing 
test used in Garner to determine whether the force used was 
reasonable.42 In addition, the Court held that in analyzing non-
deadly force, the balancing test "requires careful attention to 
the facts and circumstances of each particular case.43 Factors 
to consider included, but were not limited to: (1) the severity of 
the crime, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat 
to safety, and (3) whether the suspect was resisting arrest or 




37 [d. at 390. 
38 [d. 
39 [d. at 391. 
40 [d. 
41 [d. at 399. Graham alleged the officers used excessive force in violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. [d. at 390. The district court 
applied a four-factor due process analysis including "(1) the need for the application of 
force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used; (3) 
the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) whether the force was applied in a good faith 
effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm." [d. (citing 644 F.Supp. 246, 248 (WDNC 1986)) (internal 
quotes omitted). The Fourth Circuit majority agreed with the Due Process analysis. 
[d. at 391. The Supreme Court, following its Garner decision, held that because the 
force used to make an arrest is a seizure, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness stan-
dard applies and thus, a substantive due process approach is inappropriate. [d. at 395. 
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Court remanded to determine if Graham's arrest was unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.45 
Thus, in applying the balancing test to deadly and non-
deadly force, two reasonableness standards emerge.46 When an 
officer uses deadly force, the Garner standard applies, which is 
appropriate only "if an officer has probable cause to believe 
that a suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious 
physical injury to the officer or others. "47 On the other hand, if 
non-deadly force is used, the less rigorous Graham standard 
applies, and the Court must balance several relevant factors 
when making the reasonableness determination.48 
C. THE DOG BITE CASES: APPLYING GARNER AND GRAHAM 
To appreciate the Ninth Circuit's application of existing 
law in Miller, as well as this Note's critique of that application, 
it is necessary to discuss briefly major Ninth Circuit cases in-
volving police dogs. As the cases below indicate, the Ninth Cir-
cuit has consistently held that using a police dog does not con-
stitute deadly force.49 However, while the Ninth Circuit has 
also consistently held that using a police dog does not consti-
tute excessive force, the court has also made it clear that under 
certain circumstances, an excessively long dog bite could con-
stitute excessive force. 50 
1. Police Dogs and Deadly Force - Vera Cruz v. City ofEs-
condido 
After consuming more than two six-packs of beer, Robert 
Vera Cruz threatened employees at a local fast-food restau-
rant.51 He left the restaurant but returned a short while later 
with a knife strapped to his hip.52 The restaurant employees 
called the police, and when Officer Eric Distel and his dog ar-
45 [d. at 399. 
46 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962 n.3 (2003). 
47 [d. 
48 [d. 
49 E.g. Brewer, 210 F.3d at 1098. 
50 [d. at 964 (citing Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
51 Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido, 139 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1997). 
52 [d. 
6
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rived, Vera Cruz was at the back of the restaurant throwing 
objects out the back door.53 When he saw Officer Distel, Vera 
Cruz attempted to flee.54 Officer Distel gave two warnings and 
then released the dog, who bit Vera Cruz's right arm, bringing 
him to the ground.55 After disarming Vera Cruz, Officer Distel 
ordered the dog to release.56 As a result of the bite, Vera Cruz 
suffered severe injuries to his right upper arm, requiring sur-
gery and an eight-day hospital stay.57 Vera Cruz filed a lawsuit 
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California alleging that the force used was both deadly and ex-
cessive, and his arrest was an unreasonable seizure in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.58 The trial court found in favor of 
the officer. 59 On appeal, Vera Cruz claimed the district erred in 
refusing to instruct the jury on the Garner deadly force stan-
dard.60 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that Garner, the leading Su-
preme Court case involving deadly force, established when 
deadly force is appropriate, but failed to define what consti-
tutes deadly force.61 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit, looking to 
the Supreme Court's rationale in Garner, concluded that force 
is deadly only when it presents "more than a remote possibility 
of death."62 Otherwise, the court reasoned, "all uses of force 
would be subject to Garner's deadly force requirements because 
almost any use of force could cause death under peculiar 
enough circumstances."63 Thus, because Vera Cruz failed to 
offer evidence showing the existence of "more than a remote 
possibility of death" from the dog, the Ninth Circuit held that 





57 Id. at 660-66l. 
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2. Police Dogs and Excessive Force 
a Mendoza v. Block 
After robbing a bank in Hacienda Heights, California, 
Ronald Mendoza fled the scene by car and then on foot.65 Sher-
iffs Deputies later found Mendoza's abandoned car, ran the 
license plate, and discovered he had previously served time for 
bank robbery.66 The deputies also received information warn-
ing that Mendoza may be armed.67 After several hours, depu-
ties finally located Mendoza hiding under some bushes on pri-
vate property.68 Numerous warnings later, deputies released a 
police dog, who quickly located Mendoza and dragged him out 
of the bushes by his right arm.69 Mendoza continued strug-
gling with the dog, and the dog bit his left side.70 Once deputies 
handcuffed Mendoza, they ordered the dog to release.71 After 
his arrest, Mendoza filed a lawsuit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California, claiming the 
deputies used excessive force.72 The district court found in fa-
vor of the deputies, concluding that the deputies acted rea-
sonably under the circumstances. 73 
Mendoza was the first Ninth Circuit excessive force case 
involving a police dog. 74 The court reasoned that a Fourth 
Amendment analysis is applicable to "any arrest situation 
where force is used, whether it involves physical restraint, use 
of a baton, use of a gun, or use of a dog."75 Accordingly, using 
dogs does not require a separate excessive-force analysis, thus, 
excessive-force claims involving police dogs are properly ana-
lyzed under the Graham reasonableness standard.76 However, 
after applying the Graham factors in this case, the court held, 
"[u]sing a police dog to find Mendoza, and to secure him until 









74 Id. at 1361. 
75 Id. at 1362. 
76Id. 
8
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss1/8
2004] UNREASONABLE USE OF FORCE 199 
he stopped struggling and was handcuffed, was objectively rea-
sonable under these circumstances."77 Because Mendoza com-
mitted robbery, was likely armed, fled from police, and strug-
gled with the officers, using a police dog under these circum-
stances was reasonable under Graham, and did not constitute 
a Fourth Amendment violation.7S 
b. Watkins v. City of Oakland 
Officer Craig Chew and his dog, Nero, along with four 
other officers, responded to a silent alarm at an Oakland auto 
body shop located in a commercial warehouse.79 The officers 
saw the suspect inside the building, but they could not tell 
whether he was armed.so Officer Chew gave two warnings be-
fore releasing the dog, who found Watkins hiding in a car, and 
bit him.s1 When officers reached the defendant, they ordered 
him to show his hands.s2 According to Chew, it took about 
thirty seconds before Watkins complied with the officers' orders 
but once he did, the dog was ordered to release the suspect.S3 
Watkins suffered serious injuries to his right foot, including 
fractures, lacerations and puncture wounds that subsequently 
required two skin graft surgeries.54 
Watkins filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California, claiming that Officer Chew 
used excessive force. s5 The district court denied the defendants' 
request for summary judgment, holding that Watkins raised a 
"genuine issue of material fact as to whether the force used 
against [Watkins], including allowing Nero to continue biting 
[him] until [he] showed his hands was reasonable under the 
77 Id. at 1363. 
78 Id. at 1362-1363. 




83 Id. Chew and another officer at the scene both stated that it took ten to fifteen 
seconds for Watkins to comply with the officers' orders. Id. Later, in an interview with 
Oakland Police Department Internal Affairs, Chew stated that it took about thirty 
seconds before Watkins showed his hands. Id. 
84 Id. at 1090-91. 
85 Id. at 1090. 
9
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circumstances. "86 The defendants appealed the district court's 
order denying summary judgment.87 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because an 
excessively long dog bite and improper encouragement by offi-
cers to prolong the bite could constitute excessive force, the dis-
trict court properly denied defendants' summary judgment mo-
tion.88 Thus, although the court did not ultimately determine 
whether the force used here was excessive, it did make clear 
that a prolonged dog bite, in this instance up to thirty seconds, 
could constitute excessive force.89 
c. Chew v. Gates 
Thane Carl Chew (no relation to Officer Chew in Watkins 
v. City of Oakland) ran and hid in a scrap yard after a police 
officer pulled him over for a traffic violation.90 The officer dis-
covered Chew had three outstanding arrest warrants, and 
called for backup.91 Officer Daniel Bunch and his dog, Volker, 
were among those who arrived at the scene.92 The officers did 
not know whether Chew was armed.93 
Approximately two hours later, while out of the officers' 
sight, Volker located Chew crouching between two metal bins, 
and bit him several times before Officer Bunch found them.94 
Chew maintained that he repeatedly tried to surrender and 
offered no resistance to the officers.95 Officer Bunch, however, 
stated that when he found Chew, the suspect was "hitting the 
dog with a pipe."96 Bunch admitted to kicking Chew several 
times, "possibly in the head, face or body," in an attempt to pro-
tect the dog.97 Chew suffered severe lacerations to his left fore-
arm and left side.98 
86 [d. (internal quotes omitted). 
87 [d. 
86 [d. at 1093. 
89 [d. 
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Chew filed a suit in the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California against Officer Bunch, the 
City of Los Angles, and Police Chief Daryl Gates, claiming the 
attack violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreason-
able seizures.99 The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of all of the defendants except Officer Bunch. 100 At 
trial, the jury returned a $13,000 general verdict against 
Bunch.lol After trial, Chew appealed the district court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants.l02 
On appeal, one of the main issues the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed was whether the district court erred in finding "the Los 
Angeles Police Department's policy governing the use of police 
dogs to seize fleeing and hiding suspects" constitutional. 103 
While the majority held that the district court had erred in 
finding the policy constitutional, the judges did so for slightly 
different reasons.104 Judge Reinhardt, writing for the majority, 
took a Graham excessive-force approach, while Judge Norris 
preferred a Garner deadly-force analysis. lOS 
In assessing the gravity of the intrusion, Judge Reinhardt 
concluded that the force used to apprehend Chew was severe.10G 
Volker bit Chew three times before achieving a solid hold, and 
dragged him four to ten feet.l07 By Chew's account, the attack 
nearly severed his arm.IOS Further, by allowing Volker to seize 
a suspect out of officers' sight, Officer Bunch should have ex-
pected such a mauling to occur, because the dog was beyond 
the reach of a countermanding order if and when the officers 
located Chew.l09 In other words, because the attack occurred 
99 Id. at 1435. Chew also alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. One ofthe many issues the court addressed was whether Chew was barred 
from obtaining further damages because of the $13,000 jury verdict. Id. The Ninth 
Circuit noted that from the record, it was unclear whether the judgment was compen· 
sation for Chew's damages from the dog bite or from the assault by Officer Bunch. Id. 
Because the record was unclear on this issue, the court concluded that the judgment 
did not bar Chew from pursuing his claims for damages resulting specifically from the 
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outside of the officers' view, they were unable to intervene to 
mitigate unnecessary injury.llo 
Next, Judge Reinhardt applied the three Graham factors, 
starting with whether Chew posed an immediate threat to the 
safety of others.lll Here, Judge Reinhardt reasoned that be-
cause officers had no reason to believe Chew was armed, was 
initially stopped for a traffic violation, did not engage in any 
threatening activity after fleeing, and did nothing more than 
"hide quietly," he did not pose an immediate threat to officer or 
public safety.ll2 Thus, this factor weighed in favor of Chew.1l3 
Judge Reinhardt next addressed whether the suspect was 
resisting arrest or attempting to flee. 1l4 Regarding whether the 
suspect was "actively resisting arrest," Judge Reinhardt con-
cluded that while the suspect did flee from police, he did not 
physically resist the arresting officers, nor did the officers have 
any reason to believe he would physically resist. 115 Regarding 
whether the suspect was attempting to evade arrest by flight, 
Judge Reinhardt noted the answer was "yes" and "no," reason-
ing that in the broad sense, he was, but more narrowly, his 
flight ended once he was in the scrap yard. lls 
Next, Judge Reinhardt addressed the severity of the 
crime.ll7 He noted that Chew was stopped for a traffic viola-
tion. lls Although officers received information that Chew had 
three prior outstanding felony warrants for his arrest, the offi-
cers did not know what the crimes of the three felony arrest 
warrants were; thus, the information was of "limited" signifi-
cance.1l9 In addition, because Chew was trapped in a scrap 
yard, surrounded by police, officers were not forced to make 
split-second decisions. 120 Nonetheless, Judge Reinhardt felt 
these two factors cut "slightly" in favor of the defendants.121 
llO [d. 
111 [d. 
112 [d. at 1442. 
113 [d. 
114 [d. 





120 [d. at 1443. 
121 [d. 
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Finally, Judge Reinhardt balanced the intrusion on Chew's 
Fourth Amendment interests against the government's coun-
tervailing interests. 122 He concluded that while close, the most 
important factor, whether Chew posed an immediate threat, 
cut "strongly" in favor of Chew. 123 Therefore, because there was 
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the force 
used was excessive, the court reversed the district court's par-
tial summary judgment. 124 
Judge Norris agreed with Judge Reinhardt that the dis-
trict court erred in its partial summary judgment regarding the 
policy department's policy using police dogs.125 However, Judge 
Norris argued that a deadly-force analysis was appropriate. 126 
He reasoned that a dog, depending on how it is trained, quali-
fies as an instrument of deadly force.127 "[IJf the LAPD dogs, as 
trained and deployed, constitute instruments of deadly force, 
then the LAPD canine policy violates the Fourth Amendment 
in exactly the same manner as did the Tennessee statute [in 
Garner] because it fails to limit the application of deadly force 
to those suspects who pose a significant threat to others."128 
Therefore, because the issue of whether the LAPD dogs 
amounted to instruments of deadly force was a genuine issue of 
fact, the district court erred in its partial summary judgment.129 
Based on the above cases, notwithstanding Judge Norris' 
concurring opinion in Chew, the Ninth Circuit has consistently 
held that using police dogs does not constitute deadly force.13o 
Accordingly, the Graham excessive-force analysis, including 
the three Graham factors, is the appropriate standard in as-
sessing the reasonableness of using police dogs.l31 Further, us-
ing dogs can be unreasonable under certain conditions, such as 
when a dog bites a suspect for an unusually long duration.132 
122 [d. 
123 [d. 
124 [d. at 1440. 
125 [d. at 1435. 
126 [d. 
127 [d. at 1453. 
128 [d. at 1454-55. 
129 [d. at 1455. 
130 Brewer, 210 F.3d at 1098. As recent as 2000, the Ninth Circuit held that using 
police dogs does not constitute deadly force. [d. 
131 Chew, 27 F.3d at 144l. 
132 Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093. 
13
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II. MILLER V. CLARK COUNTY: THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
On the night of January 21, 2001, a Clark County Sheriffs 
Deputy on routine patrol became "suspicious" of a silver 
Pontiac Fiero, and ran a computerized check on the license 
plate.133 The computer told the deputy that the plate belonged 
to a different vehicle. 134 Because a switched license plate is a 
traffic violation, and could indicate a stolen vehicle, the deputy 
signaled the driver to pull over, but the driver refused.135 
At the foot of a long driveway, the driver slowed the car 
and a passenger got out.136 The deputy called for backup and 
pursued the passenger, while the driver turned onto and pro-
ceeded up the driveway.137 Other deputies soon arrived, includ-
ing Deputy Bylsma and his police dog, Kimon.138 The deputies 
walked up the long driveway and found the abandoned Fiero in 
front of a house.139 While searching the car, Deputy Bylsma 
discovered a knife on the car seat.140 At some point, deputies 
learned the driver's name was James Tracey Miller, that Miller 
lived in the house with his parents, his family was not "law 
enforcement friendly," and that a mentally ill person lived 
there.14l Deputies also learned that Miller was wanted for "at-
tempting to flee from police by driving a car with a wanton or 
willful disregard for the lives of others,» a felony in Washington 
State. 142 
Deputy Bylsma, his dog, Kimon, and another deputy 
tracked Miller through the property's dark, densely wooded 
terrain. 143 Bylsma shouted that he would release a police dog in 
five seconds unless Miller surrendered.144 When there was no 
response, Bylsma released Kimon, and ordered the dog to find 
133 Miller, 340 F.3d at 960. The facts of the case did not indicate if Miller had 







140 [d. The knife was seven to eight inches in length. [d. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. 
143 [d. 960-61. 
144 [d. at 961. 
14
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Miller and seize him using a "bite and hold" technique. "145 Af-
ter about a minute, Deputy Bylsma heard Miller scream, and 
immediately ran into the woods, locating Miller within forty-
five to sixty seconds. 146 After verifying Miller was unarmed, 
Deputy Bylsma ordered Kimon to release.147 
Miller suffered extensive injuries during the attack, re-
quiring surgery and several days in the hospital.148 According 
to Miller's hospital records, "[his] skin was torn in four places 
above the elbow, and the muscles underneath were shredded. 
[His] biceps muscle was 'balled up' in the antecupital [sic] 
space. His brachialis muscle-the muscle closest to the bone 
and alongside the brachialis artery-was torn. [His] injury 
went as deep as the bone. "149 Miller continues to suffer from his 
injuries.15o 
Miller brought suit against Deputy Bylsma and Clark 
County in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Washington, alleging that using a police dog under 
these circumstances violated his Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable seizures.151 Miller alleged that using the 
dog constituted excessive as well as deadly force. 152 Relying on 
Vera Cruz's holding that using police dogs is not deadly force, 
the district court granted the defendants partial summary 
judgment on the deadly force issue.153 After a bench trial, the 
district court ruled in favor of both defendants on the excessive 
force issue, holding that using the dog was not excessive force 
145 [d. Kimon was ordered to seize Miller by biting his arm or leg. [d. The "bite 
and hold" is a K-9 training technique in which the handling officer commands the dog 
to locate and seize the suspect, usually by biting an arm or leg. RS. Eden, Handler 
Control vs. Bark and Hold Apprehension Techniques (last visited September 18, 2003) 
<http://www.policek9.com/htmVbitvsbk.html>. If the suspect remains calm, the dog 
will exert only minimal pressure. [d. If, however, the suspect struggles, attempts to 
flee, or threatens the safety of the dog or officers, the dog will bite more aggressively 
until the suspect is subdued. [d. Only when the suspect is under control will the offi-
cers order the dog to release. [d. 







153 [d. at 961-962. 
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under the circumstances.154 Miller appealed the district court's 
ruling. 155 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined whether the force 
used was either deadly or excessive156 Specifically, the court 
looked at whether "ordering a trained police dog to 'bite and 
hold' the suspect until officers arrived on the scene less than a 
minute later" violated the suspect's Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable seizures.157 The court first disposed of the 
deadly force allegation.158 While citing the Ninth Circuit's rule 
that using a police dog does not generally constitute deadly 
force, the court recognized that they had never considered the 
deadly force issue in the context of a dog bite lasting almost a 
minute.159 The court considered the testimony of Dr. Craig 
Eddy, Miller's medical expert, who stated in an affidavit that a 
dog with Kimon's biting force could lacerate arteries in the 
arms or legs resulting in the suspect bleeding to death. l60 Fur-
ther, if the dog punctured a critical artery in the arm or leg, the 
suspect could bleed to death within a few minutes.161 Dr. Eddy 
testified that in his opinion, a prolonged dog bite to the ex-
tremities without immediate restraint constitutes the use of 
deadly force, and that "the force and location of the dog bite 
wounds [here] had a reasonable probability of causing Mr. 
Miller's death."162 
The court also considered Deputy Bylsma's testimony, who 
admitted that it was "possible" Kimon could bite a suspect's 
head or neck if more readily available than an arm or leg, and 
such a bite, arguably, would more likely result in death. l63 
Deputy Bylsma also admitted that a suspect's injuries are 
likely to be more severe the longer a dog is allowed to bite. l64 
Notwithstanding these considerations, the court found the risk 
154 [d. at 961. 
155 [d. 
156 [d. at 961, 963. 
157 [d. at 960. 
158 [d. at 961-962. 
159 [d. at 962. 
160 [d. 
lSI [d. 
IS2 [d. at 963 D.7. An extremity is an arm or a leg. An arm is often referred to as 
an upper extremity and a leg as a lower extremity. MOSBY'S POCKET DICTIONARY 
OF MEDICINE, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH 441. 
163 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962. 
164 [d. at 963. 
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of death from Miller's injuries remote, holding that "the possi-
bility that a properly trained police dog could kill a suspect un-
der aberrant circumstances does not convert otherwise non-
deadly force into deadly force."165 Relying on Vera Cruz's hold-
ing that deadly force is force that presents "more than a remote 
possibility" of death under the circumstances in which it is 
used, the court concluded Miller presented no evidence that he 
was subjected to more than a remote possibility of death.166 
Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's partial summary 
judgment on the deadly force issue. 167 
The court next addressed the excessive force issue.16B Here, 
the court reiterated Graham's balancing test, in which the rea-
sonableness of a seizure is determined by balancing "the nature 
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests against the countervailing government 
interests at stake."169 In assessing the gravity of the intrusion 
on Miller's Fourth Amendment interests, the court agreed with 
the district court that the force used to seize Miller was "con-
siderable," and "exacerbated" by the bite duration, concluding, 
the intrusion was a "serious" one.l70 Therefore, because there 
was a significant intrusion on Miller's Fourth Amendment in-
terests, the second prong of the balancing test needed to out-
weigh this intrusion in order for the government to prevail. l71 
To assess the countervailing "government interests" prong 
of the balancing test, the court applied the three Graham fac-
tors.172 First, because police wanted Miller on a prior felony 
charge as well as the misdemeanor infraction, officers had a 
legitimate government interest in apprehending Miller.173 Sec-
ond, the court held Miller posed an "immediate threat" to offi-
cer safety, as well as to others.174 On this point, the court relied 
heavily on the fact that officers found a knife lying on the seat 
of Miller's car.l75 The court felt this fact indicated a "propensity 
165 [d. at 963 (italics added). 
166 [d. at 962-63 (citing to Vera Cruz, 139 F.3d at 663) (internal quotes omitted). 
167 [d. at 963. 
1GB [d. 
169 [d. at 964 (citing to Graham, 49 U.S. at 396) (internal quotes omitted). 




174 [d. at 965. 
175 [d. 
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to carry a weapon (and perhaps a weapon more lethal than the 
one he had left behind)."176 In addition, because the wooded 
terrain was familiar to Miller and unfamiliar to the deputies, 
Miller could stage an ambush, giving him a "strategic advan-
tage."l77 Therefore, the court concluded that Miller posed a se-
rious and immediate threat to officers.17S Third, since Miller 
fled the scene and hid from deputies, the court found that 
Miller was actively evading his arrest by flight. 179 Thus, the 
court found that the three factors weighed in favor of the 
state.1SO 
Finally, the court balanced the intrusion on Miller's Fourth 
Amendment rights against the countervailing government in-
terests in apprehending Miller to determine whether the force 
used by the deputy was reasonable under the circumstances.1Sl 
, Here, the court reasoned that deputies had attempted to ap-
prehend Miller first with less forceful means.1S2 According to 
the court, these attempts included signaling Miller to pull over, 
pursuing Miller by car, pursuing Miller by foot, and audibly 
warning Miller before releasing the police dog. l83 Therefore, 
considering all the circumstances surrounding the arrest, in-
cluding the three Graham factors, the court held that using a 
police dog to apprehend a fleeing felon, hiding in dark and un-
familiar woods, who was possibly armed, and in a position to 
ambush deputies, was a reasonable seizure that did not violate 
Miller's fourth Amendment rights. 1M 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAILED To PROPERLY APPLY THE 
GRAHAM BALANCING TEST IN MILLER 
Applying the Graham balancing test to determine whether 
the deputies used reasonable force to seize Miller requires a 




179 [d. at 965-966. 
180 [d. at 964-966. 
181 [d. at 966. 
182 [d. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. at 966,968. 
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situation. ls5 While the court recognized that the force used to 
apprehend Miller was "serious," the court failed to appropri-
ately weigh the seriousness of that intrusion against the gov-
ernment's interest in apprehending Miller. ls6 Here, the seri-
ousness of the intrusion on Miller's Fourth Amendment rights 
far outweighs the government's interest in apprehending him, 
and careful analysis of the facts requires the court to find the 
force used as excessive. 
A. THE INTRUSION ON MILLER'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
WAS SERIOUS 
In evaluating the gravity of the intrusion upon Miller's 
Fourth Amendment interests, two factors weigh heavily in 
Miller's favor: First, the length of the attack and second, that 
the attack occurred outside the deputies' presence.lS7 Regarding 
the length of the attack, it is significant that the length of the 
dog attack was excessively long (forty-five to sixty seconds).lss 
In fact, Miller received a longer dog bite than in any of the pre-
viously decided dog bite cases. lS9 For example, in Watkins, the 
suspect received a bite lasting up to thirty seconds, which the 
court found could be excessive.190 Given the severe damage that 
such dog bites can inflict, common police practice attempts to 
limit the bite to just a few seconds.19l 
More important, Miller's bite occurred outside the view 
and supervision of the deputies.192 Prior cases have emphasized 
that police are less able to control a dog attack when it occurs 
outside their view, and that a prolonged, unsupervised attack 
is more likely to cause serious injuries.193 For example, in 
Chew, the dog attacked the suspect, biting him three times be-
fore achieving an effective hold, and then dragged him between 
four and ten feet from his concealed location.194 The attack 
185 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
186 Miller, 340 F.3d at 964. 
187 [d. at 961. 
188 [d. 
189 [d. at 962. 
190 Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1090, 1093. 
191 See Miller, 340 F.3d at 961. 
192 [d. 
193 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441. See also Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1090. See also Men-
doza, 27 F.3d at1359. 
194 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441. 
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occurred outside the officers' view, exacerbating Chew's inju-
ries. 195 Likewise, in Watkins, the suspect also suffered severe 
injuries resulting from an attack outside the officers' control 
and supervision.196 On the other hand, in Mendoza, even 
though the suspect struggled with the dog, because the officers 
were present during the entire attack, Mendoza apparently 
suffered only minor injuries.197 Miller, however, was not within 
the deputies' sight during most of the attack, and deputies 
were too far away to intervene as the situation escalated.198 As 
a result, Miller, like the suspects in Chew and Watkins, sus-
tained serious injuries resulting from the prolonged, unsuper-
vised attack. 
In addition, if Kimon had accidentally punctured an ar-
tery, as Deputy Bylsma himself testified was a possibility, 
Miller would likely have bled to death before officers could 
reach him in time.199 In fact, the only reason the deputies found 
Miller when they did was that he screamed and continued 
screaming until they found him.200 If Miller had passed out, he 
likely would have bled to death even without the dog punctur-
ing an artery.20l As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, Miller was 
hiding in dark woods, which were unfamiliar to the deputies.202 
Yet, the court only found these facts persuasive in assessing 
the reasonableness of the deputies' actions, and chose to ignore 
these same facts when assessing the gravity of the Fourth 
Amendment intrusion.203 If they had, they might have con-
cluded the intrusion was more serious, given that Miller could 
have died because of the dark, unsupervised conditions. 
The cases suggest that during a supervised attack, the offi-
cer can·act quickly, resulting in a shorter bite and thus, a more 
"reasonable" intrusion into the suspect's Fourth Amendment 
195 [d. 
196 See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1090. 
197 See Mendoza, 27 F.3d at 1359. The court failed to mention the extent of Men-
doza's injuries, but they were probably relatively minor since the court did not indicate 
otherwise. Id. 
198 Miller, 340 F.3d at 96l. 
199 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962. 
200 [d. at 96l. 
201 [d. at 963. 
202 [d. at 964, 966. 
203 [d. at 966. 
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rights.204 However, when the dog attack is unsupervised, a pro-
longed bite is more likely to occur, resulting in injuries that are 
significantly more serious.205 Because of the significantly in-
creased risk of harm to the suspect during an unsupervised 
attack, this factor should get more weight when balancing the 
intrusion onto a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights. Here, 
however, the court failed to consider the unsupervised nature 
of the attack in its analysis. 
B. THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN APPREHENDING MILLER 
DID NOT OUTWEIGH THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT INTRUSION 
The second Graham prong requires an assessment of the 
countervailing government interests at stake.206 Again, in de-
termining the importance of the government interests, courts 
have traditionally looked to (1) the severity of the crime, (2) the 
threat posed by the suspect, and (3) whether the suspect ac-
tively resisted arrest.207 Since the third factor here is undis-
puted, this Note focuses on the court's application of the first 
and second factors. 
1. Severity of the Crime 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Miller had allegedly 
committed a misdemeanor traffic violation (mismatched license 
plates), however, what elevated the severity level in the court's 
analysis was his outstanding felony warrant.20B The court 
failed, however, to examine the particulars of the felony: At-
tempting to flee police by driving with wanton and willful dis-
regard of others, in essence, reckless driving. In Chew, al-
though the suspect's prior felony warrants were apparently in 
connection to prior burglaries, this information was not part of 
the district court's record, and was unknown to Officer Bunch 
at the time of the arrest.209 However, the Ninth Circuit rea-
204 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441. See also Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1090. See also Men· 
doza, 27 F.3d at 1359. 
205 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441. 
206 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
207 [d. 
208 Miller, 340 F.3d at 964. 
209 Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443 n.9. 
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soned that even if this information was part of the record, its 
inclusion would make no difference in the court's analysis.210 
Burglary, the court noted, rarely involves physical violence.211 
In other words, the mere fact that a suspect is wanted for a 
felony does not automatically mean that the suspect poses an 
immediate threat to officer or to public safety.212 The nature of 
the felony must be considered.213 In addition, the court also 
reasoned that the significance of Chew's warrants was further 
diminished because he was completely surrounded by police 
with little chance of escape.214 While Miller allegedly commit-
ted a crime that certainly threatened the lives of others, reck-
less driving does not seem as menacing as burglary, and in 
Chew, the court found that crime insignificant in their danger-
ousness analysis.215 Further, Miller was for the most part sur-
rounded by deputies and his chances of escape were slim.216 
In addition, this was not a situation where deputies were 
forced to make split-second decisions. For example, in Chew, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because officers had confined 
the suspect to the large scrap yard, officers had ample time to 
deliberate and consult with their superiors before taking ac-
tion, and thus, were not required to make split-second deci-
sions.217 Likewise, in Miller, deputies had confined Miller to 
the woods.218 Although hiding in the woods was perhaps not as 
confined as hiding in a scrap yard, deputies arguably had the 
upper hand. They had control over Miller's home and vehicle, 
and knew the general location of where he was hiding.219 The 
deputies had ample time to gather information and design a 
course of action. If nothing else, deputies merely had to wait 
until Miller came out of the woods. Further, even when police 
are forced to make split-second decisions based on the facts and 
circumstances confronting them in a particular situation, they 
210 [d. 
211 [d. 
212 [d. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 1706). 
213 See id. at 1442. 
214 Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443. 
215 Miller, 340 F.3d at 960. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443 n.9. 
216 See Miller, 340 F.3d at 960-61. 
217 Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443. 
218 Miller, 340 F.3d at 960-61. 
219 [d. 
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must still refrain from using force beyond that which is reason-
able under the circumstances.22o 
2. Immediate Threat to the Safety ofO{ficers and Others 
Here again, the court relied heavily on Miller's out-
standing felony reckless driving warrant to conclude Miller 
posed an immediate threat to public safety.221 However, 
Miller's dangerousness toward the public stemmed from driv-
ing, and Miller was hiding in the woods, while deputies had 
complete control over his vehicle.222 It seems unlikely that once 
Miller was separated from his vehicle, he continued to pose a 
significant threat to others. Moreover, Miller hid in the woods 
alone, hardly a threat to the public. In short, Miller did not 
pose a significant threat to others. The Ninth Circuit, however, 
failed to address these issues. 
The court also relied heavily on the fact that deputies 
found a knife on the seat of Miller's abandoned car, concluding 
that Miller was currently armed and posed an immediate dan-
ger to the deputies.223 However, it is arguably just as reason-
able that he left the only weapon he had behind, or that the 
weapon belonged to his passenger, or, perhaps, it was no 
weapon at all but merely a knife. Although the deputies be-
lieved that there was a "chance" Miller was not "law enforce-
ment friendly," and possibly had mental problems, the deputies 
had no information that indicated Miller was specifically vio-
lent.224 
In addition, the court inferred that Miller, a supposed 
mentally ill individual, was some sort of grand strategist.225 
The court reasoned that because Miller was familiar with the 
woods, if his "defiant and evasive tendencies turned violent," he 
could "ambush" the deputies.226 While Miller was familiar with 
the woods outside his home, it seems unlikely that he held such 
a distinct advantage over the deputies.227 There simply was not 
220 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443. 
221 Miller, 340 F.3d at 965. 
222 [d. at 960. 
223 [d. at 965. 
224 [d. at 960. 
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enough information known to the deputies when they arrived 
at the scene to suggest Miller posed such a threat. Moreover, if 
the deputies truly believed Miller posed such a threat, they 
could have waited until he emerged from his hiding place, and 
safely arrested him then, without jeopardizing officer safety. 
Again, because Miller, presumably hiding alone in the woods, 
posed no threat to public safety, it simply was not necessary 
under these circumstances to send deputies into a potentially 
dangerous situation to capture him.228 
In short, because Miller had not committed violent of-
fenses, posed no immediate threat to public safety, and depu-
ties had ample time to consider options other than potentially 
endangering their own safety, these two Graham factors 
weighed in favor of Miller. Therefore, in balancing the serious 
intrusion on Miller's Fourth Amendment rights against the 
countervailing government interest in apprehending Miller, the 
scale tips in favor of Miller. Thus, using a police dog to seize 
Miller, under these circumstances was excessive force. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is a point when even constitutionally permitted force 
becomes excessive.229 The Ninth Circuit agrees that while us-
ing a police dog to effect an arrest is generally permissible, a 
prolonged dog bite could constitute excessive force under cer-
tain circumstances.23o To determine the reasonableness of the 
force used requires careful attention to the particular facts of 
each case.231 The bite Miller received far outlasted those in all 
other leading cases.232 Yet the facts indicate Miller posed less 
threat than the plaintiffs in those leading cases did. Thus, 
when balancing the gravity of the intrusion on Miller's Fourth 
Amendment rights (a bite lasting forty-five to sixty seconds) 
against the government's countervailing interests (the need to 
apprehend Miller), using a police dog under these circum-
228 Id. at 960-961. 
229 See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093. 
230 Miller, 340 F.3d at 964 (citing to Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093). 
231 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 
232 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962. 
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stances constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 233 
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